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US-Präsident Bush: "Ich glaube nach wie vor, dass Iran gefährlich ist" / The Präsident: "I believe after the NIE that Iran is dangerous"

Ein Bericht von NIE (National Intelligence Estimate) sorgt für Aufregung - 16 US-Geheimdienste: Iran hat 2003 sein Nuklearwaffenprogramm gestoppt. Artikel und Pressekonferenz mit Bush / Press Conference by the President

Ein Bericht der im NIE (National Intelligence Estimate) zusammengefassten 16 US-Geheimdienste, der am 3. Dezember 2007 der Öffentlichkeit vorgestellt wurde (siehe: Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley), hat die internationale Diskussion über das iranische Atomprogramm und die westliche Sanktions- und Kriegsdrohungspolitik neu entfacht.
Im Folgenden dokumentieren wir zwei Kommentare, die sich mit der neuen Lage befassen; der erste stammt aus der Feder von Karl Grobe (Frankfurter Rundschau), der zweite von Knut Mellenthin (junge Welt). Im Anschluss daran dokumentieren wir die Passagen aus einer Pressekonferenz des US-Präsidenten, die sich mit dem Geheimdienstbericht und der US-amerikanischen Iranpolitik befassen.



Der dritte Weltkrieg - abgesagt

Von Karl Grobe *

Mit zwei Sätzen haben die vereinigten Spionagedienste der USA die Washingtoner Iran-Politik ausgehebelt. Erstens: 2003, also seit vier Jahren, hat das Teheraner Regime die Entwicklung von Kernwaffen gestoppt. Zweitens: Die iranische Führung entscheidet auf Grund von Kosten-Nutzen-Analysen.

Der Bericht hat seit mindestens einem Jahr in irgendwelchen geheimen Schubladen in Washington herumgelegen. Den Diensten war die ganze Zeit klar, dass der Iran sein Atomwaffenprogramm längst auf Eis gelegt hat. Soll man sich im Ernst vorstellen, dass die regierenden Herren George W. Bush und Richard Cheney keinen blassen Dunst davon hatten?

Wussten sie Bescheid, dann war Bushs Oktober-Gerede von der Gefahr eines dritten Weltkriegs mindestens leichtfertig. Dann war der mit dem Eilt-Stempel versehene Plan, in Polen und Tschechien eine Raketenabwehrstellung zu installieren, nicht rational begründbar, sondern ideologisch motiviert. Wobei der ideologische Cocktail - außer dem vorgeschobenen Grund - noch zwei Zutaten hatte: die Absicht, es den Russen mal richtig zu zeigen, und den Wunsch, Europa in böse Alte und gute Neue zu zerlegen. Vielleicht war der Hinweis auf Teheran gar das Mittel zu jenem Zweck. Gleich ob er auf Nichtwissen - am Ende Leichtsinn - beruhte oder wider besseres Wissen erfolgte, also verlogen war. Die Bush-Regierung hat den europäischen Verbündeten da etwas zu erklären - nur eben nicht wie Bush am Dienstag, dass sie immer recht hat.

Der Verweis auf die Rationalität iranischer Entscheidungen hat weitere Konsequenzen. Nicht jede paranoid klingende Auslassung des Teheraner Präsidenten Mahmud Ahmadinedschad und anderer Hardliner im Lande zieht konkretes politisches Handeln nach sich. Die Analyse mancher Landeskenner, seine Hetzreden seien auch, wenn nicht hauptsächlich, für den innenpolitischen Gebrauch bestimmt, wird durch die Einschätzung der geheimen Washingtoner Dienste plausibler. Schließlich wird - auch - im Iran nächstes Jahr gewählt.

Sicher hat die für uns so unappetitliche Ahmadinedschad-Fraktion personell und sachlich Tatsachen geschaffen - aber eben keine weltbedrohenden nuklearen. Zweifellos betreibt sie regionale Großmachtpolitik, wofür die besagte Kampfrhetorik ebenso Mittel zum Zweck ist wie die stete Erinnerung an den 54 Jahre zurückliegenden Sturz der gewählten Regierung Mossadegh durch die CIA und die US-Waffenhilfe für Saddam Hussein vor erst 25 Jahren. Und wie die sehr aktuelle Anschauung des gegenwärtigen Chaos im Irak.

Den hatten die USA mit angeblichen geheimdienstlichen Beweisen für ein Bagdader Massenvernichtungswaffenprogramm begründet, wofür ihr damaliger Außenminister, Colin Powell, sich nachträglich öffentlich geschämt hat. Die Dienste wenigstens wollen den für Hunderttausende tödlichen Fehler von 2002/2003 nicht noch einmal machen, auch wenn ihr jüngster Bericht das ebenso wenig eingestehen mag wie den Umstand, dass der vorherige Iran-Bericht (von 2005) irrig war.

Die grundlegende Erkenntnis, die wirklich Mächtigen in Teheran entschieden rational, nach einer Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse, gibt schließlich einen klaren Hinweis für die künftige Iran-Politik: Verhandlungen mit den Lenkern der iranischen Politik sind ein geeignetes Mittel zur Konfliktlösung; sie sind der Kriegsgewalt allemal vorzuziehen. Verzicht auf politische und wirtschaftliche Druckmittel bedeutet das nicht; Außenpolitik ist nicht das Geschäft von Betschwestern. Die (alten) Europäer müssen in dieser Frage nicht übermäßig viel Neues lernen. Sie können höchstens leise bedauern, sich zu sehr an den Meister - Meister? - in Washington angelehnt zu haben.

Dem aber ist dringend anzuraten, Fakten zu akzeptieren. Zuerst das Faktum, dass der Iran existiert, Gewicht in der Region hat und einen Schlüssel zum Irak-Problem besitzt. Sodann das Faktum, dass das weltpolitische Konzert mit vielen Instrumenten gespielt wird, nicht nur mit der Bush-Cheney-Pfeife. Drittens ganz praktisch, dass der wünschenswerte Regimewechsel in Teheran Sache der Iraner ist, nicht der Amerikaner. Und viertens, dass der Iran als Mitglied des Atomstoppvertrags das Recht auf kontrollierte zivile Nuklearenergie hat.

Dass der Iran irgendwann doch mal Kernwaffen zu bauen beabsichtigen könnte, schließt der Bericht der 16 Horch- und Guck-Dienste zwar nicht aus. Das zu verhindern ist jedoch Verhandlungssache.

* Aus: Frankfurter Rundschau, 5. Dezember 2007


Feind muß Feind bleiben

Von Knut Mellenthin **

Iran war gefährlich. Iran ist gefährlich. Und Iran wird gefährlich sein.« – Die Reaktion von Präsident George W. Bush auf den am Montag abend vorgelegten Bericht der 16 US-amerikanischen Geheimdienste zum iranischen Atomprogramm ist erwartungsgemäß. Die Dienste sagen in dem nur aus Behauptungen bestehenden Papier, daß Iran seit Ende der 80er Jahre an der Entwicklung von Atomwaffen gearbeitet, aber diese Bemühungen im Herbst 2003 auf Grund des internationalen Drucks gestoppt habe. Im Gegensatz dazu gehen die Internationale Atomenergiebehörde IAEA, Rußland und China sowie die meisten blockfreien Staaten davon aus, daß es keine Beweise für ein iranisches Atomwaffenprogramm in der Vergangenheit gibt. Der Bericht der US-Geheimdienste wird weithin als eine zumindest teilweise Bestätigung dieser Einschätzung interpretiert.

Nicht so von Präsident Bush. Der Bericht habe nichts an seinen Ansichten geändert, »ganz im Gegenteil«. Er sehe das Papier vielmehr als »ein Warnsigal« und »als eine Gelegenheit für uns, mit der Sammlung der internationalen Gemeinschaft fortzufahren, um das iranische Regime zur Aufgabe seines Programms zu zwingen«, sagte er am Dienstag. Außenministerin Condoleezza Rice äußerte sich ähnlich: »Ich sehe den Iran weiterhin als eine gefährliche Macht in der internationalen Politik.« Sie habe in Telefongesprächen mit ihren Kollegen in Europa, Rußland und China auf die Verabschiedung einer dritten Sanktionsresolution durch den UN-Sicherheitsrat gedrängt.

Erste Reaktionen aus London, Paris und Berlin deuten darauf hin, daß sich die US-Regierung dabei auf ihre europäischen Verbündeten verlassen kann. Ein britischer Regierungssprecher sagte: »Wir meinen, daß die Schlußfolgerungen des Berichts die von der internationalen Gemeinschaft bereits unternommenen Schritte rechtfertigen.« – Eine Sprecherin des französischen Außenministeriums erklärte: »Wir müssen den Druck auf Iran aufrechterhalten. (...) Wir werden weiter an der Einführung restriktiver Maßnahmen im Rahmen des UN-Sicherheitsrats arbeiten.« – Für verschärfte Sanktionen sprach sich auch der deutsche Außenminister Frank-Walter Steinmeier aus. Zugleich sagte er aber, daß der Bericht Chancen biete, »in die Atomgespräche mit Iran neue Bewegung zu bringen«. Alle Seiten müßten nun klug handeln und diese Gelegenheit nicht verspielen.

Im Gegensatz zu den EU-Politikern erklärte der russische Außenminister Sergej Lawrow, man müsse die Frage weiterer Sanktionen auf Grund des US-Geheimdienstberichts neu prüfen. Lawrow wiederholte die bekannte Ansicht seiner Regierung, daß es für ein iranisches Atomwaffenprogramm keine Anzeichen gebe. Auch der chinesische Botschafter bei der UNO, Wang Guangja, sprach davon, daß die Notwendigkeit schärferer Sanktionen durch den Bericht in Frage gestellt werde.

Indessen feiern iranische Medien und Politiker das teilweise Eingeständnis der USA. »Dieser Bericht versucht, Amerika aus seiner Sackgasse zu befreien«, sagte Präsident Mahmud Ahmadinedschad am Mittwoch auf einer Massenkundgebung, »aber er ist zugleich eine Siegeserklärung für das iranische Volk gegen die Großmächte«. »Wenn ihr ein neues politisches Spiel starten wollt, wird die vereinte iranische Nation euch Widerstand leisten und keinen Schritt von ihrem Programm zurückweichen.«

** Aus: junge Welt, 6. Dezember 2007


Auszüge aus der Pressekonferenz von US-Präsident Bush am 4. Dezember 2007

Press Conference by the President (Extracts)

December 4, 2007
James S. Brady Press Briefing Room at the White House


Q Mr. President, a new intelligence report says that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program four years ago, and that it remains frozen. Are you still convinced that Iran is trying to build a nuclear bomb? And do the new findings take the military option that you've talked about off the table?

THE PRESIDENT: Here's what we know. We know that they're still trying to learn how to enrich uranium. We know that enriching uranium is an important step in a country who wants to develop a weapon. We know they had a program. We know the program is halted.

I think it is very important for the international community to recognize the fact that if Iran were to develop the knowledge that they could transfer to a clandestine program it would create a danger for the world. And so I view this report as a warning signal that they had the program, they halted the program. And the reason why it's a warning signal is that they could restart it. And the thing that would make a restarted program effective and dangerous is the ability to enrich uranium, the knowledge of which could be passed on to a hidden program.

And so it's a -- to me, the NIE provides an opportunity for us to rally the international community -- continue to rally the community to pressure the Iranian regime to suspend its program.

You know, the NIE also said that such pressure was effective, and that's what our government has been explaining to other partners in keeping the international pressure on Iran. The best diplomacy, effective diplomacy, is one of which all options are on the table.

Q Mr. President, Iraq's WMD turned out not to be there, and now Iran halted its nuclear program in 2003. Are you concerned that the United States is losing credibility in the world, and now may be seen as the boy who cries -- who called wolf?

THE PRESIDENT: Actually, I am -- I want to compliment the intelligence community for their good work. Right after the failure of intelligence in Iraq, we reformed the intel community so that there was a lot of serious considerations of NIEs in a way that would give us confidence. And here's a, I think, a very important product that is a result of the reforms we've put in place. As a matter of fact, the American people should have confidence that the reforms are working, and that this work on the intel community is important work.

People said, well, why is it that you can't get exact knowledge quicker? Well, the answer is, is because we're dealing with a regime that is not very transparent and, frankly, we haven't had a very good presence in Iran since 1979. And that's why I instructed the intel community to beef up its intelligence on Iran, so we could have a better sense for what they're thinking and what they're doing. And this product is a result of intelligence reform and, more importantly, the good, hard work of our intelligence community.

One of the reasons why this is out in the public arena is because I wanted -- and our administration believed that, one, it was important for people to know the facts as we see them. Secondly, that members of my administration had been very clear about the weapons program earlier this year and, therefore, it's important for the American people to see that there has been a

-- a reevaluation of the Iranian issue.

David.

Q Mr. President, thank you. I'd like to follow on that. When you talked about Iraq, you and others in the administration talked about a mushroom cloud; then there were no WMD in Iraq. When it came to Iran, you said in October, on October 17th, you warned about the prospect of World War III, when months before you made that statement, this intelligence about them suspending their weapons program back in '03 had already come to light to this administration. So can't you be accused of hyping this threat? And don't you worry that that undermines U.S. credibility?

THE PRESIDENT: David, I don't want to contradict an august reporter such as yourself, but I was made aware of the NIE last week. In August, I think it was Mike McConnell came in and said, we have some new information. He didn't tell me what the information was; he did tell me it was going to take a while to analyze. Why would you take time to analyze new information? One, you want to make sure it's not disinformation. You want to make sure the piece of intelligence you have is real. And secondly, they want to make sure they understand the intelligence they gathered: If they think it's real, then what does it mean? And it wasn't until last week that I was briefed on the NIE that is now public.

And the second part of your question has to do with this. Look, Iran was dangerous, Iran is dangerous, and Iran will be dangerous if they have the knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon. The NIE says that Iran had a hidden -- a covert nuclear weapons program. That's what it said. What's to say they couldn't start another covert nuclear weapons program? And the best way to ensure that the world is peaceful in the future is for the international community to continue to work together to say to the Iranians, we're going to isolate you. However, there is a better way forward for the Iranians.

Now, in 2003, the Iranian government began to come to the table in discussions with the EU-3, facilitated by the United States. In other words, we said to the EU-3, we'll support your efforts to say to the Iranians, you have a choice to make: You can continue to do policy that will isolate you, or there's a better way forward, so that it was the sticks-and-carrots approach.

You might remember the United States said at that point in time, we'll put the WTO on the table for consideration, or we'll help you with spare parts for your airplanes. It was all an attempt to take advantage of what we thought was a more open-minded Iranian regime at the time -- a willingness of this regime to talk about a way forward. And then the Iranians had elections, and Ahmadinejad announced that -- to the IAEA that he was going to -- this is after, by the way, the Iranians had suspended their enrichment program -- he said, we're going to stop the suspension, we'll start up the program again. And that's where we are today.

My point is, is that there is a better way forward for the Iranians. There has been a moment during my presidency in which diplomacy provided a way forward for the Iranians. And our hope is we can get back on that path again. But what is certain is that if Iran ever had the knowledge to develop a nuclear weapon and they passed that knowledge on to a covert program, which at one time in their history has existed, the world would be more dangerous. And now is the time for the international community to work together.

Q Mr. President, thank you. Just to follow, I understand what you're saying about when you were informed about the NIE. Are you saying at no point while the rhetoric was escalating, as "World War III" was making it into conversation, at no point nobody from your intelligence team or your administration was saying, maybe you want to back it down a little bit?

THE PRESIDENT: No, nobody ever told me that. Having said -- having laid that out, I still feel strongly that Iran is a danger. Nothing has changed in this NIE that says, okay, why don't we just stop worrying about it. Quite the contrary. I think the NIE makes it clear that Iran needs to be taken seriously as a threat to peace. My opinion hasn't changed.

And I just explained, Jim, that if you want to avoid a really problematic situation in the Middle East, now is the time to continue to work together. That's our message to our allies, and it's an important message for them to hear. And here's the reason why: In order for a nation to develop a nuclear weapons program they must have the materials > from which to make a bomb, the know-how on how to take that material and make it explode, and a delivery system.

Now, the Iranians -- the most difficult aspect of developing a weapons program, or as some would say, the long pole in the tent, is enriching uranium. This is a nation -- Iran is a nation that is testing ballistic missiles. And it is a nation that is trying to enrich uranium. The NIE says this is a country that had a covert nuclear weapons program, which, by the way, they have failed to disclose, even today. They have never admitted the program existed in the first place.

The danger is, is that they can enrich, play like they got a civilian program -- or have a civilian program, or claim it's a civilian program -- and pass the knowledge to a covert military program. And then the danger is, is at some point in the future, they show up with a weapon. And my comments are, now is the time to work together to prevent that scenario from taking place. It's in our interests.

Yes, ma'am.

Q Mr. Bush, how can you say nothing has changed? You may see it this way, but the rest of the world is going to see the lead as the fact that the nuclear weapons program was halted in 2003.

THE PRESIDENT: Right.

Q When you first saw this, weren't you angry? You didn't know about Syria. In 2005, you had the same assessment, "with high confidence that Iran currently is determined to develop nuclear weapons." And now, quite the opposite. How can you possibly think the rest of the world is going to continue -- to the degree it did -- to rally around you and your intelligence?

THE PRESIDENT: Because many in the world understand that if Iran developed a nuclear weapon, the world would be a very dangerous place. Secondly, many of the world are going to take heart in noting that it's diplomatic pressure that caused them to change their mind. And plenty of people understand that if they learn how to enrich, that knowledge can be transferred to a weapons program, if Iran so chooses.

And I think this is a -- it's a -- to me, it's a way for us to continue to rally our partners. That's why I'm working the phones and Condi Rice is working the phones. All of us are calling our partners. And I appreciate many of the comments that have come out of the capitals.

One thing is for certain. The NIE talks about how a carrot-and-stick approach can work. And this is heartening news to people who believe that, on the one hand, we should exert pressure, and on the other hand, we should provide the Iranians a way forward. And it was working until Ahmadinejad came in. And our hope is that the Iranians will get diplomacy back on track.

Yes, ma'am.

Q Why should you trust this intelligence if it's different than 2005? Why should we trust it any more?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you know, I'm -- without getting into sources and that, that's -- I believe that the intelligence community has made a great discovery, and they've analyzed the discovery, and it's now part of our government policy.

(...)

Q Mr. President, to go back to Iran for a minute, the Non-Proliferation Treaty doesn't prohibit a country like Iran from having the knowledge to enrich uranium. Are you setting a different standard in this case, and a different international obligation on Iran? And is that going to complicate the efforts to keep the pressure on when it comes to sanctions at the United Nations?

THE PRESIDENT: The problem that most of the world has seen in Iran stems > from the fact that they hid their program. That's what the NIE says. The '68 agreement that Iran signed contemplated full transparency and openness. They didn't contemplate a regime that would have a covert nuclear weapons program -- all the more reason for the international community to continue to work together. If somebody hid their program once, they could hide it again. If somebody defied the agreement that they signed, the codicils of the agreement they signed, they could do it again. And most of the world understands that Iran with a nuclear weapon would be a serious danger to peace. And therefore, now is the time to work together to convince them to suspend their program.

People say, would you ever talk to Iran? For you veterans here, for those who have been following this administration for a while, you might remember that I have consistently said that we will be at the table with the EU-3 if Iran would verifiably suspend their program -- and the offer still stands.

What changed was the change of leadership in Iran. We had a diplomatic track going, and Ahmadinejad came along and took a different tone. And the Iranian people must understand that the tone and actions of their government are that which is isolating them. There's a better way forward for Iran. There's a better way forward for the Iranian people than one in which they find themselves isolated in the world. Their economy can be stronger. But their leadership is going to have to understand that defiance, and hiding programs and defying IAEA is not the way forward.

And my hope is, is that the Iranian regime takes a look at their policies and changes their policies back to where we were prior to the election of Ahmadinejad, which was a hopeful period. They had suspended their program, they were at the table. The United States had made some very positive gestures to convince them that there was a better way forward. And hopefully we can get back to that day.

Bret.

Q Mr. President, thank you. I'd like to ask for one clarification and one question, if I may.

THE PRESIDENT: Sure. Depends on what the clarification is.

Q The clarification is, are you saying that this NIE will not lead to a change in U.S. policy toward Iran, or shift in focus?

THE PRESIDENT: I'm saying that I believed before the NIE that Iran was dangerous, and I believe after the NIE that Iran is dangerous. And I believe now is the time for the world to do the hard work necessary to convince the Iranians there is a better way forward. And I say, hard work -- here's why it's hard. One, many companies are fearful of losing market share in Iran to another company. It's one thing to get governments to speak out; it's another thing to convince private sector concerns that it's in our collective interests to pressure the Iranian regime economically.

So I spend a fair amount of time trying to convince our counterparts that they need to convince the private sector folks that it is in their interests and for the sake of peace that there be a common effort to convince the Iranians to change their ways, and that there's a better way forward.

So our policy remains the same. I see a danger. And many in the world see the same danger. This report is not a "okay, everybody needs to relax and quit" report. This is a report that says what has happened in the past could be repeated, and that the policies used to cause the regime to halt are effective policies, and let's keep them up, let's continue to work together.

Source: www.whitehouse.gov


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