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Wie friedlich ist Irans Atomprogramm? Wie friedlich ist die Iranpolitik des US-Präsidenten?

Artikel plus Dokumentation: Presseerklärung des Chefkoordinators der 16 US-Geheimdienste, Stephen Hadley / Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley

Im Folgenden dokumentieren wir die Erklärungen von Stephen Hadley zum Stopp des iranischen Nuklearwaffenprogramms sowie - zuvor - einen Artikel, der sich kritisch mit der Iranpolitik des amtierenden US-Präsidenten auseinandersetzt.



Beim Lügen erwischt

Über ein Jahr lang versuchte US-Präsident Bush einen Iran-Report der Geheimdienste zu deckeln – vergeblich. Nun wird Teheran entlastet

Von Rainer Rupp *


Iran hat sein – von den USA als Bedrohung verurteiltes – Atomwaffenprogramm bereits 2003 gestoppt. Diese Bewertung nahm der lang erwartete »National Intelligence Estimate« (NIE) vor – ein geheimer Bericht, der die übereinstimmende Meinung aller 16 US-Nachrichtendienste zusammenfaßt. Dessen Inhalt wurde am Montag bekannt. Die darin enthaltene überraschende Ein­schätzung der iranischen Nuklearpolitik könnte weitreichende Folgen haben. So kommentierte am Dienstag die New York Times, daß sich »mit großer Wahrscheinlichkeit das letzte Jahr der Bush-Administration neu gestalten« werde.

Tatsächlich wurde mit der Studie Präsident George W. Bush aus dem direkten Umfeld seiner Administration als Lügner bloßgestellt. Seit Jahren hatte der Mann im Weißen Haus die zivile Nutzung der Kernenergie durch Iran als »gefährlich« bezeichnet, international Sanktionen durchgesetzt und mit militärischen Schlägen gedroht. Fest steht nun: Bei der Schürung der Kriegshystrie bediente er sich – wie schon in Vorbereitung des Irak-Kriegs – bewußt des Mittels der Fehlinformation.

Als er beispielsweise am 28. August 2007 vor Veteranen der »American Legion« den »Schatten eines nuklearen Holocaust« ausmachte, der wegen Irans »aktiver« Entwicklung von Atomwaffen über dem Mittleren Osten liege und »die Sicherheit der USA und ihrer Freunde und Verbündeten bedroht«, wußte er längst über den Inhalt der NIE Bescheid. Schließlich hatte sein Vize Richard Cheney deren Veröffentlichung seit über einem Jahr immer wieder hinausgeschoben. Und als Bush am 17. Oktober sogar mit dem »Dritten Weltkrieg« drohte, falls Iran sein Atomwaffenprogramm nicht stoppen würde, versuchte er – wider besseres Wissen –, die Welt zu erpressen.

Massiv unterstützt wurden Bush und Cheney von einflußreichen zionistischen Organisationen in den USA ebenso wie von Vertretern der neokonservativen Bewegung, die starke Positionen in den beiden großen Parteien der USA haben, sowie von sympathisierenden Medien. Zugleich drückten der Präsident und sein Stellvertreter immer wieder öffentlich »Verständnis« für den Fall aus, daß Israel Iran angreifen würde.

Seit 1995 waren die NIE-Geheimdiensterkenntnisse alljährlich zu dem Schluß gekommen, daß Iran »innerhalb von fünf Jahren« die Fähigkeit zum Bau von Atomwaffen haben werde. 2005 hieß es erstmals, daß es »bis Anfang, Mitte der nächsten Jahrzehnts dauert, bis Iran atomwaffenfähig sein« würde. Nachrichtendienstlichen Quellen zufolge hatte man sich in den US-Diensten bei der Erstellung der NIE um mehr Sorgfalt und weniger vorauseilenden, politischen Gehorsam bemüht – insbesondere bei der CIA, die nach dem Propagandadebakel um den Irak-Krieg für die Lügen des Weißen Hauses zum Sündenbock gemacht worden war. Die neue Herangehensweise der Spionageagenturen ärgerte das Weiße Haus zunehmend.

Als schließlich im Herbst 2006 der Entwurf für die neue NIE zu Iran vorlag, schaltete sich Vizepräsident Cheney direkt ein und schickte die Version zurück an die Verfasser. Was er in der ersten wie auch folgenden Fassungen zu lesen bekam, gefiel ihm nicht – so die Enthüllung des renommierten US-Historikers mit Kontakten in die Dienste, Gareth Porter, am 9. November 2007 in der Huffington Post. Trotzdem wurde die NIE zu Iran nun aufgrund des wachsenden Drucks im Kongreß vorgelegt. Aus ihr geht hervor, daß Cheney den Diensten seinen Willen nicht – oder zumindest nicht ganz – aufzwingen konnte. In der NIE heißt es nämlich, daß die US-Dienste »nicht wissen, ob es Iran derzeit überhaupt vorhat, Atomwaffen zu entwickeln«.

* Aus: junge Welt, 5. Dezember 2007

"Irans Atomprogramm ist friedlich"

Wien/Teheran. Der jüngste US-Geheimdienstbericht, wonach der Iran seit 2003 kein Atomwaffenprogramm verfolge, ist international mit Genugtuung aufgenommen worden. Die Atomenergiebehörde (IAEA) erklärte, ihre eigene Einschätzung stimme mit der der US-Geheimdienste überein. Der Iran müsse zwar noch einige wichtige Punkte seines Atomprogramms erläutern, die IAEA habe aber keine Hinweise auf aktuelle Bemühungen um Kernwaffen oder geheime Nuklearaktivitäten im Iran, informierten IAEA-Generaldirektor Mohamed ElBaradei in Wien.
Das iranische Außenministerium sprach von einer »Korrektur« in Washington. »Dieses Eingeständnis aus dem Innersten der sensibelsten Organe der US-Regierung ist Beweis, daß das iranische Atomprogramm friedlich ist«, wurde der Abgeordnete Alaeddin Borudscherdi von der amtlichen Nachrichtenagentur IRNA zitiert.
(AP/jW)



Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley

James S. Brady Press Briefing Room
December 3, 2007


MR. HADLEY: Good afternoon, I'm Steve Hadley, the President's National Security Advisor. I want to talk a little bit about the recent National Intelligence Estimate that was released to the executive branch and to the Congress today. There was an earlier briefing this afternoon by the Deputy Director of National Intelligence, Don Kerr, and also by the Director of Central Intelligence, Mike Hayden. And I wanted to give a little bit more context and set the findings of the NIE in a broader historical perspective.

The introduction is going to go on a little bit; there's a lot to tell. This is a complicated estimate. The unclassified key judgments that were released today are a little difficult to sort through and I want to try and lay this out for everybody, so I'll have an opening statement, probably 15-20 minutes, but there will be lots of time to answer questions at the end.

The Director of National Intelligence has today released the unclassified key judgments from the intelligence community's latest estimate of Iran's nuclear weapons efforts and its uranium enrichment program. The classified version of this National Intelligence Estimate was briefed to the President last Wednesday, November 28, and has been delivered to relevant congressional committees this morning.

On balance, the estimate is good news. On one hand, it confirms that we were right to be worried about Iran seeking to develop nuclear weapons. On the other hand, it tells us that we have made some progress in trying to ensure that that does not happen. But it also tells us that the risk of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon remains a very serious problem.

The estimate offers grounds for hope that the problem can be solved diplomatically, without the use of force, as the administration has been trying to do. And it suggests we have the right strategy: intensified international pressure, along with a willingness to negotiate a solution that serves Iranian interests while ensuring the world that it will never have to face a nuclear-armed Iran. But the bottom line is that for that strategy to succeed, the international community has to turn up the pressure on Iran -- with diplomatic isolation, United Nations sanctions, and with other financial pressure. And Iran has to decide that it wants to negotiate a solution.

This is a complicated subject and the new Intelligence Estimate is a complicated document. Let me summarize the key judgments and then try and walk you through it and answer your questions. First, let me summarize the key judgments. The IC has high confidence -- high confidence -- that Iran had a covert nuclear weapons program that it has never acknowledged and continues to deny. The intelligence community has high confidence that Iran halted its covert nuclear weapons program in the fall of 2003. And they have moderate confidence that it had not restarted that program as of mid-2007.

They judge with high confidence that the halt in other nuclear-related decisions was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure, resulting from exposure of Iran's previously undeclared nuclear work involving uranium enrichment. The intelligence community says they do not know whether Iran currently intends to develop nuclear weapons, but they assess with moderate to high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. And the intelligence community assesses with moderate confidence that convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo the eventual development of nuclear weapons will be difficult.

Let me see if I can unpack this a bit and put it in context. First, remember how we got here. A little background: If a state is looking to become a nuclear-weaponed state, it needs three things. It needs weapons-grade nuclear material. It needs the technical know-how to fashion this nuclear material into a weapon. And it needs a means to deliver the weapon on a target, like a ballistic missile. The hardest step in today's world is acquiring weapons-grade nuclear material. Unless you steal it, there are two ways to get it: If you have a nuclear power reactor you can reprocess spent fuel coming out of that reactor, or you can create nuclear material by a process called uranium enrichment. This process produces fuel for nuclear power reactors, but it can also create weapons-grade nuclear material for a nuclear bomb.

In 1968, Iran signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and pledged never to seek to acquire nuclear weapons. That's what Iran undertook to do. It signed what is called a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, or the IAEA, under which it was to declare all its nuclear-related activities and open itself up to inspections by the IAEA.

In August 2002, an Iranian opposition group revealed the existence of a secret uranium enrichment plant in Iran at a place called Natans. The plant was secret. It had not been declared, as required, to the IAEA. Iran at that time had no operational nuclear power reactors, so why did it need a uranium enrichment plant? Iran was actively developing ballistic missiles. These facts raised a real concern that this was all part of an effort to develop nuclear weapons. So the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, backed by the international community, began a vigorous effort to convince Iran to suspend its enrichment activity, and thus reassure the world that it did not intend to develop nuclear weapons.

And the pressure seemed to work. In October 2003, Iran agreed to cooperate with the IAEA and suspend its uranium enrichment activities. Considerable further diplomacy involving both the IAEA and what's called the EU-3 -- representatives of Britain, France and Germany -- resulted in what's called the Paris Agreement of November 2004. In this agreement, Iran reaffirmed and extended the suspension of its enrichment activities. And the EU-3 agreed to negotiate long-term technology, economic and security arrangements for Iran.

Despite this progress, the intelligence community in May of 2005 assessed with high confidence that Iran currently was determined to develop nuclear weapons. The intelligence community maintained this assessment throughout this year, 2007. Indeed, Director of National Intelligence Negroponte told an open session of the House intelligence community on January 1, 2007, that, "our assessment is that Tehran is determined to develop nuclear weapons." DNI McConnell later told a Senate panel in open session on February 27 that, "We assess that Tehran seeks to develop nuclear weapons."

The irony is that one month after the intelligence community released this assessment, in June of 2005, Ahmadinejad wins a runoff election and becomes Iran's President. On August 1, 2005, just two months after taking power, Ahmadinejad informs the IAEA that he has decided to resume uranium enrichment, and does so beginning in January 2006.

For the next two years, through a whole series of IAEA Board of Governors resolutions urging Iranian compliance, through two U.N. Security Council sanctions resolutions, sweetened by negotiating offers by the EU-3 and the promise that the United States would join those negotiations, the international community tried unsuccessfully to get Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment activities, and those efforts to get the suspension continue today.

Also during this period, the President directs the intelligence community to enhance its capabilities to gather intelligence on Iran's nuclear programs.

Earlier this year, Congress called for a new National Intelligence Estimate on Iran. It is in part delayed in order to process -- the finalization of that NIE is delayed in part in order to process new intelligence, some of which has been received in the last few months.

The National Intelligence Estimate released today reveals that there was a covert nuclear weapons program. It also reveals that, unknown to us, that program was halted in the fall of 2003. So the covert nuclear weapons program was unknown to us, suspected, unknown; now confirmed. But what was also unknown was that the program was halted in the fall of 2003. That secret -- that covert nuclear weapons program was halted at the same time the Iranians publicly announced that they were suspending their public and declared uranium enrichment program.

So where does that leave us? One, we have good reason to continue to be concerned about Iran developing a nuclear weapon, even after this most recent National Intelligence Estimate. In the words of the NIE, "Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons if a decision is made to do so." For example, Iran's civilian uranium enrichment program is continuing. And as you know, once a country masters the technology to enrich uranium for use even in a civilian nuclear power program, it could readily use the same technology to produce weapons-grade uranium. As we have said, weapons-grade uranium is the long pole in the tent for a nuclear weapon.

And Iran continues to develop, test and deploy ballistic missiles -- a very attractive delivery system for a nuclear weapon. For example, the Iranian Defense Minister publicly acknowledged a medium-range ballistic missile called the Ashura, which could reach much of Eastern Europe.

Finally, we are very unsure of Iran's attentions [sic], even with respect to the covert nuclear weapons program that Iran has halted. Again, let me quote the National Intelligence Estimate: "We do not have sufficient intelligence to judge confidentially whether Tehran is willing to maintain the halt of its nuclear weapons program indefinitely while it weighs its options, or whether it will or already has set specific deadlines or criteria that will prompt it to restart the program."

Again from the NIE: "We assess with moderate confidence that convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo the eventual deployment of nuclear weapons will be difficult given the linkage many within the leadership probably see between nuclear weapons development and Iran's key national security and foreign policy objectives."

But the NIE gives us reason to believe that our current strategy stands the best chance of convincing Iran to give up its nuclear ambitions. Again, let me quote for a final time from the NIE: "Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003, primarily in response to international pressure, indicates Tehran's decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach, rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of political, economic and military costs. This in turn suggests that some combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige and goals for regional influence in other ways might, if perceived by Iran's leaders as credible, prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear weapons program. It is difficult to specify just what such a combination might be."

We have been pursuing this very strategy for over two years, since Iran resumed its nuclear enrichment. If we are to avoid the grim choice between accepting an Iran on the path to nuclear weapons or considering the use of force, we need to intensify our pressure on Iran, while making clear that if they do suspend enrichment, there is an opportunity for better relations with the international community.

Source: www.whitehouse.gov


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